Valparaiso University

ValpoScholar
Law Faculty Publications

Law Faculty Presentations and Publications

1987

Evidentiary Use of Other Crime Evidence: A
Survey of Recent Trends in Criminal Procedure
Susan Stuart
Valparaiso University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence
Commons

Recommended Citation
Susan Stuart, Evidentiary Use of Other Crime Evidence: A Survey of Recent Trends in Criminal Procedure, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 183 (1987).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff
member at scholar@valpo.edu.

Evidentiary Use of Other Crime Evidence: A Survey
of Recent Trends in Criminal Procedure
SUSAN STUART*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When writing a survey article, there is a tendency for the author
to search for some defect in the law of the surveyed cases, in order to
demonstrate the author's acumen in theoretical reasoning, as opposed
to that of the courts'. However, this survey topic the admissibility of
evidence of other bad acts and crimes in a criminal trial does not lend
itself to such a self-serving exercise. The law in Indiana with respect to
.

.

this relatively narrow subject area is instead well-established and genera;lly
well-reasoned. This survey period did include., however, several cases in
which the practical application of the extant law rested upon a ques-

tionable foundation or was altogether improper. In most instances, the
error was harmless, but the precedential use of such improper reasoning
could well prove damaging in later cases. The purpose of this Article,
therefore, is not to remedy any flaw in the law but to suggest a more
temperate and circumspect approach to its practical application. Because
of the frequency with which one specific context occurred during the
survey period, the Article will particularly emphasize the principles governing the admissibility of unrelated crimes. and other bad acts as they
are relevant to the charges at trial.
II.

TRIAL ADMISSION OF OTHER CRIMES AND MISCONDUCT GENERALLY

The general rule in Indiana is that evidence of crimes and misconduct
of a criminal defendant, other than of the charged offenses, is not
admissible at trial.1 However, there are various exceptions to this rule
of exclusion. Their application arises either when the defendant's character is at issue or when the proffered evidence is relevant to an element
of the charged offense. The four exceptions most widely recognized in
Indiana relate to (1) the defendant's bad character, (2) proof of the

*Formerly associated with Buschmann, Carr & Meyer, Indianapolis; Fonner Law Clerk
to the Honorable Stanley B. Miller, Indiana C.ourt of Appeals. B.A., DePauw University,
1973; M.Ed., Valparaiso University. 1976; J.D .• Indiana University School of LawIndianapolis, 1982. The author expresses appreciation to Don Anderson for his patience
and his editing skills.
•E.g., Lee v. State, 271 Ind. 307, 3l2, 392 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1979); Bruce v. State,
268 Ind. 180, 245, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1077, cert. denied, 489 U.S. 988 (1978); Paulson
v. State, 181 Ind. App .. 559, 560, 393 N .E.2d 211, 212 (1979).
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crime on trial, (3) the res gestae of the charged offense, and (4) cumulative
and/or explanatory evidence after the defendant himself has broached
the subject.

A.

Admissibility to Prove Defendant's Character
.·

There are two reasons why a court may admit evidence of other
crimes to show a defendant'S unsavory character. The foremost .reason
2
is to impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness. This particular
''bad character'' exception has statutory underpinnings, 3 but its evidentiary use is limited to a defendant's "prior convictions for crimes which
would have rendered a witness incompetent. These crimes are: treason,
murder, rape, arson, burglary, robbery[,] kidnapping, forgery and wilful
and corrupt perjury. , 4 The rationale for allowing such use is that the
nature of the convictions reflects upon a witness's propensity for truth
and veracity while testifying at trial. 5
The second use of ''bad character" evidence, on the other hand,
permits introduction of a wider array of bad conduct but can only be
applied on a more limited scope. This use occurs when a criminal
defendant places his character directly into evidence as part of his defense
strategy. Once a defendant's reputation for good character is at issue,
the state may then offer specific acts of prior misconduct into evidence
as contradictory proof of bad character. 6 However, use of bad character
evidence for this purpose is limited by rules of relevance and therefore
7
must go directly to contradict the defense's evidence. Such a limitation
is to assure, to the extent possible, that the bad character evidence is
circumscribed for use only as rebuttal evidence rather than as substantive
8
proof of the defendant's guilt of the charged offense. Therefore, in
See Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses: Common Law Principles and Modern
Trends, 34 IND. L.J. l. 23 (1958).
3
IND. CoDE § 34-1-14-14 (1982) states, "Any fact which might heretofore be shown
to render a witness incompetent, may be hereafter shown to affect his credibil'ity."
4
Ashton v. Anderson, 258 Ind. 51. 63, 279 N.E.2d 210, 217 (1972); see also Daniels
v. State, 274 Ind. 29, 32, 408 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (1980).
5
Ashton. 258 Ind. at 62, 279 N.E.2d at 217 ("only those convictions for crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement shall be admissible"). The Indiana Supreme Court
has further declared that a witness' credibility may be impeached only by convictions,
not generic bad acts. Hensley v. State. 256 Ind. 258, 262, 268 N.E.2d 90, 92 (1971).
6
E.g., Hauger v. State, 273 Ind. 481, 483, 405 N.E~2d 526, 527 (1980); Robertson
v. State, 262 Ind. 562, 565, 319 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1974).
7
See Bond v. State, 273 Ind. 233, 240-41, 403 N.E.2d 812, 818 (1980); Robertson,
262 Ind. at 566, 319 N .E.2d at 836.
8
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404, which states; ''Evidence of a person's character or
a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion ... /'; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAMt JR.;
fEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5236, at 397 (1978) (hereinafter FEDERAL P:aACTICE
2
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either of these two situations, a prosecutor may not generally impute
bad character through evidence of other crimes unless the defendant
first places his character at issue, either directly or by merely taking the
witness stand. However, there are other situations in which a prosecutor
may offer such evidence for the purpose of substantively proving guilt,
aside from bad character generally.

B.

Admissibility to Prove Charged Offense

A second method of circumventing the general prohibition against
use of other crime evidence is to proffer other unrelated crimes and
bad acts as relevant proof that the defendant committed the offense
with which he is charged. 9 The Indiana Supreme Court adopted this
exclusion long ago when it stated:
"It is only on rare occasions that proof of the commission of
another crim,e by a defendant is either necessary or helpful
towards establishing the crime with which he is charged. Hence
the evidence is ordinarily irrelevant, while at the same time its
admission would necessarily operate to so prejudice a jury against
a defendant as that in a doubtful case it might control the
verdict. * * * But it has never been held by any court of
responsible authority that the people cannot prove the facts
constituting another crime, when those facts also tend to establish
that the defendant committed the crime for which he is on trial.
Such a holding would accomplish the absurd result of permitting
a rule intended to prevent a defendant from being prejudiced
in the eyes of the jury because of his life of crime to so operate
in certain cases as to prevent the people from proving the facts
necessary to convict him of the crime charged. " 10
Further refinement of this principle has especially focused on the relevancy
of the other crime evidence to specific facts in dispute.
Indiana appellate courts look chiefly at whether the evidence of
unrelated crimes proves or tends to prove a fact in issue at trial. 11 This
connection has been variously characterized as ''a fact in issue,''l 2 "any

9

See, e.g., Hergenrother v. State, 215 Ind. 89, 18 N.E.2d 784 (1939).

/d. at 94-95, 18 N .E.2d at 787 (quoting People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 340,
61 N.E. 286, 312 (1901)).
11
See, e.g., Tippett v. State, 272 Ind. 624, 627, 400 N.E.2d 1115, 1117-18 (1980);
Bruce v. State, 268 Ind. 180, 245, 375 N .E.2d 1042, 1077, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988
(1978); Maldonado v. State, 265 Ind. 492, 495, 355 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1976); Kallas v.
State, 227 Ind. 103, 114, 83 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1949)~
12
Tippett, 272 Ind. at 627, 400 N.E.2d at 1118; Maldonado, 265 Ind. at 495, 355
N.E.2d at 846; Gaston v. State, 451 N.E.2d 360, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
'

0
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material fact," 13 "any essential element of the crime charged," 14 and
"an issue in serious dispute at the trial." ts As succinctly stated by the
Indiana Supreme Court: ''[T]he law will not permit the State to depart
from the issue, and introduce evidence of other extraneous offenses or
misconduct that have no natural connection with the pending
16
charge .... '' This restriction obviously prevents the introduction of
other crime evidence merely to present the defendant to the jury as a
person with a "criminal bent." 17 The state therefore is constrained to
present other crime evidence only in the context and within the confines
of the charged offense. This principle is the rule of logical relevance. 18
Typically, other crime evidence can be fitted into specific categ&ies
of logical relevance. The list of categories intent, motive, purpose,
identity, common scheme or plan, and guilty knowledge has been recited
so frequently as to approach the form of a litany . 19 And the admission
of evidence within these categories may be appropriate not only for
proving the commission of the charged offense but also for disproving
a defense. 20 There exists a further well-recognized category in Indiana
law in which evidence of a more general pattern (rather than of discrete
offenses) is admissible. This pattern is admitted for its tendency to prove
a defendant's guilt at a sex offense trial under th.e "depraved sexual
instinct" exception. 21 Under the current state of the law then, Indiana
courts have established fairly well-defined guidelines for admitting evidence of other crimes under the relevancy exception.
There is, however, a further limit on this exception, regardless of
the evidence.' s logical relevance to the trial. Even if the logical relevance
of other crime evidence is established within the categories listed above,

uKallas, 227 Ind. at 114, 83 N.E.2d at 773.
'"Hergenrother, 215 Ind. at 96, 18 N.E.2d at 787.
5
' Thornton v. State, 268 Ind. 456, 458, 376 N .E.2d 492, 493 0.978).
6
' 0unn v. State, 162 Ind. 174, 182, 70 N .E. 521, 523 ( 1904).
•'Bruce, 268 Ind. at 245, 375 N.E.2d at 1077; see also Lee v. State, 271 Ind. 307,
312, 392 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1979).
HI See, e.g., FED. R. Ev1n. 401, which defines relevant evidence as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.''
9
' See Haynes v. State, 411 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); see also Cobbs
v. State, 264 Ind. 60, 62, 338 N.E.2d 632, 633 (1975); Paulson v. State, 181 Ind. App.
559, 560, 393 N.E.2d 211, 212 (1979).
20
E.g., Jackson v. State, 267 Ind. 62, 66, 366 N .E.2d 1186, 1189 (1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 975 (1978); Henderson v. State, 259 Ind. 248, 251, 286 N.E.2d 398, 400 (1972);
Kallas, 227 Ind. at 122, 83 N.E.2d at 777.
21
E.g., Bowen v. State, 263 Ind. 558, 563, 334 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1975); Miller v.
State. 256 Ind. 296, 299, 268 N.E.2d 299, 301 (1971); Lamar v. State, 245 Ind. 104, 109,
195 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1964). The "depraved sexual instinct" exception is utilized only where
the offenses exhibit an ''unnatural" sexual proclivity, such as for sodomy or for incest.
Cobbs, 264 Ind. at 62-63, 338 N.E.2d at 633-34.

187
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a court may still exclude it if such evidence lacks legal relevance. 22
Evidence is legally irrelevant if it will mislead the jury or if it is too
remote from the charged offense. 23 Evidence of other crimes is inherently
prejudicial to some extent. For such other crime evidence to be admissible,
therefore, its probative value must substantially outweigh its prejudicial
effect on the jury. 24 Otherwise, it may seriously affect the defendant's
right to a fair trial, 25 and trial courts, in their discretion, may exclude
it.26
In sum, the chief concern with respect to legal relevance is whether
the jury is likely to find a defendant guilty due to his mere participation
in other crimes rather than upon proof of the elements of the charged
offense. The relevancy exception for the introduction of other crime
evidence is therefore in counterpoise to the bad character exception
because the trial court's primary purpose is to exclude evidence that is
relevant only to showing a defendant's bad character. In contrast, the
res gestae and cumulative evidence exceptions evince very little concern
regarding the substantive effect of evidence of bad character.
•

C.

Admissibility Under Miscellaneous Exceptions

There are two other instances in Indiana where the general rule of
exclusion can be overridden by the circumstances of the individual case.
The first, the res gestae exception, permits the admission of evidence
of other crimes where they are part of the same transaction. Such
evidence includes "ac:ts, statements, occurrences and circumstances substantially contemporaneous with the crime charged. " 27 This exception,
too, is not without bounds and is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court. 28
The final exception is more an estoppel of the defendant's right to
object to the admission of other crime evidence than a true exception.
This estoppel occurs when the defense ''opens the door'' by eliciting

See, e.g., FED. R. Ev1o. 403, stating that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
23
Hergenrother, 215 Ind. at 94, 18 N .E.2d at 786.
24 See supra note 22; see also Paulson, 181 Ind. App. at 561, 393 N.E.2d at 212.
2
~Thornton, 268 Ind. at 458, 376 N.E.2d at 493.
26
Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. 1982); Wilson v. State, 432 N.E.2d 30
(Ind. 1982); Tippett, 272 Ind. at 627, 400 N.E.2d at 1117-18; Thornton, 268 Ind. at 458,
376 N.E.2d at 493; Manuel v. State, 267 Ind. 436, 438, 370 N.E.2d 904, 905·06 (1977).
27 Lee v. State, 267 Ind. 315, 320, 270 N .E.2d 327, 329 (1977) (citation omitted);
Gross v. State, 267 Ind. 405, 407, 370 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1977) (quoting Kiefer v. State,
241 Ind. 176, 178, 169 N.E.2d 723, 724 (1960)).
28
Blankenship v. Statte, 462 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Ind. 1984).
22
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testimony of other crimes directly29 or by introducing testimony of only
part of a story, the completion of which includes evidence of other
crimes. 3° Clearly, a defendant has no right to complain of the state's
use of such evidence when he was the party who broached the subject
in the first instance. Beyond these two miscellaneous exceptions, the
main inquiry into the admissibility of other crimes evidence is still whether
the defendant has placed his reputation in issue or whether the state
can convince the court that the evidence is both logically and legally
relevant to a material fact at issue.
.

Ill.

.

RECENT CASES

Most of the notable recent cases concerned the relevancy exception,
although a few cases pertained to the other three exceptions. The surveyed
31
cases range from the well-reasoned Burch v. State, where the Indiana
Court of Appeals was faced with an alibi defense and the dilemma of
proving identity with evidence of another crime, to the scantily reasoned
Stout v. State, 32 which upheld the admissibility of an accomplice's testimony to a defendant's participation in prior crimes by relying on but
a single precedent which had no rationale. Between these two extremes
were cases addressing the use of an evidentiary "harpoon" and proper
and improper admissions of police investigations, as well as an assortment
of cases where the court reached the right result despite the reasons
•
gtven.
Critiquing these cases is difficult because any analysis of relevancy
is necessarily subjective. No bright-line objective template can be applied
by appellate courts to such cases because the standard of review is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. 33 It is clear in some cases,
however, that the evidence had little, if any, relevance to the case and
its admission would have been prejudicial error but for the harmless
error doctrine. 34 This Article attempts to demonstrate flaws in the applications of the law and to suggest how these problems may be resolved.

See, e.g., Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 76"77, 383 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1978).
30
See, e.g., Davis v. State, 481 N .E.2d 387, 389-90 (Ind. 1985).
29

487 N .E.2d 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
32
479 N .E.2d 563 (Ind. 1985).
33
E.g., Wagner v. State, 474 N .E.2d 476, 493 (Ind. 1985); Fisher v. State, 468 N .E.2d
1365, 1368 (Ind. 1984); Mayes v. State, 467 N.E.2d 1189, 1194-95 (Ind. 1984) ("Trial
courts have wide discretion in determining whether proffered evidence is relevant. We will
not disturb the courCs ruling upon such a matter, absent a clear abuse of that discretion.").
14
See FED. R. C1v. P. 61; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a), which states that "[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shaH be
disregarded.''
11
•

OTHER CRIME EVIDENCE

1987]

A.

189

Right Result, Right Reason

One of the best reasoned cases of the survey period also included
one of the closest judgment calls. In Burch v. State, 35 a jury found the
defendant guilty of attempted robbery and battery, both while the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. 16 The state's case relied upon the
following salient facts: On Thursday, November 3, 1983, at 7:45 p.m.,
the defendant accosted a Ball State University co-ed on the second level
of a parking garage on the university campus. The defendant ''goosed"
the victim and then followed her to her car, questioning her about her
plans for the evening~ When they reached the victim's car, the defendant
drew a knife and ordered her into her car. After she refused, the
defendant pressed the knife to her chest and demanded her backpack
from the car. A struggle ensued, and the defendant fled. The victim
identified Burch as her assailant. Burch interposed an alibi defense. 37
To impeach the alibi, the state presented evidence of a similar uncharged
attack.
Another Ball State co-ed testified to an incident that occurred the
following Thursday evening, in the same location of the same parking
garage and with similar sexual overtones. The victim of this second
incident, however, recognized her attacker and was able to locate his.
the defendant's photograph in her high school yearbook. The state
argued this other crime testimony was essential to surmount the defendant's alibi. 38 The court of ap·peals agreed. 39
After a thorough analysis of the factual similarities and the differences in the two incidents, the court determined that the key similarities
in the two occurrences time, location, and sexual characteristics presented a similar and distinctive "modus operandi,'' relevant to the
question of the assailant's identity raised by the defendant's alibi de40
fense. The court admitted that the facts presented ''a very close question,"
but because "identity was the primary issue," the other crime evidence
was crucial to the state's case and therefore was admissible. 41 However
close the question, under the abuse of discretion standard, the court
reached the correct conclusion.
The ''modus operandi'' exception to the general rule is a w~ll
recognized method of proving identity. 42 To fit within this category,
487 N.E.2d 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
36
/d. at 177.

35

/d. at 179.
38/d.
37

l9Jd.

d.
41
/d. (footnote omitted).

~OJ

42

See

FEDERAL PRACTICE

&.

PROCEDURE, s~pra

note 8, § 5246, at 512.
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"[t]he acts or methods employed must be so similar, unusual, and
distinctive as to earmark them as the acts of the accused. ''43 The difficulty
with the facts in Burch is that sexual attacks upon women in parking
garages are not uncommon. However, repeated attacks at the same time
on the same day of the week at the same location do create a distinctive
pattern. The fact that both victims positively identified the defendant
as their assailant greatly lessened the opportunity for error and added
yet another distinguishing feature to the ''modus operandi" of the attacks.
The nature of the other crime evidence was also not so inflammatory
as to make it legally irrelevant. Therefore, this evidence was properly
admitted because the exception's requirements were scrupulously applied~
The ''modus operandi" exception was also the compelling reason
for admitting evidence of other bad acts in Ea-kins v. State. 44 In Eakins,
a high school music teacher was charged with battery and telephone
45
harassment arising out of an incident with one of his female students.
During her freshman year, the young girl had complained to school
authorities about the defendant's amorous attentions to his female stu. .
dents as well as his physical contacts with them. During the following
school year, the defendant hugged and kissed the complainant. Not long
afterward, the girl's family began to receive harassing and obscene
telephone calls that were later traced to the defendant's home. The girl
identified the defendant as the caller. However, the defendant evidently
denied the allegation because the identity of the caller became the focal
46
issue at trial. In response to the defendant's apparent denial, the state
introduced testimony of a former student who described her sexual
relationship with the defendant. 47 This former student testified that when
she terminated her involvement with the defendant, she received an
abusive telephone call from him as well as repeated hang-ups. Although
the similarity of events is perhaps not as distinctive as in Burch, the
two incidents here were significantly unique because both girls were
familiar with the defendant and the sound of this voice. Because telephone
offenses are so intrinsically difficult to prove inasmuch as the victim
does not see the perpetrator, the other crime evidence in this case was
extremely logically relevant to the issue of the caller's identity . 48 Thus,
·lWillis v. State, 268 Ind. 269, 272, 374 N .E.2d 520, 522 (1978) (citation omitted).
44
484 N .E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985),
45
/d. at 608.
46
/d. The facts are not clear with respect to the defendant's case. The. only other
issue addressed on appeal concerned '"newly discovered" evidence that the defendant's
son had made similar telephone calls. /d. at 609. One can therefore assume that the
defendant denied any part in the offense; otherwise, this newly discovered evidence would
not have been necessary.
4

'/d. at 608.
.
The appellate court could have easily sidestepped the issue entirely. Eakins was

4

48

tried to the court, rather than before a jury, and there exists a presumption in Indiana

1987]
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the logical relevance exception to the general rule of exclusion was
properly applied under the circumstances, and the evidence was properly
admitted. 49
One other notable case in which the identity of the perpetrator was
seriously in dispute was Henderson v. State. 50 In Henderson, the defendant was on trial for burglary and theft arising from facts relayed to
police by an eyewitness. 51 The witness observed a man leave a neighbor's
home with a television set and place the set in a gold Ford LTO bearing
Indiana license plate number 99H8889. The police later discovered that
the defendant owned a Ford with Indiana license plate number 99T8889,
but the witness had some difficulty identifying the defendant. 52
At trial, defendant challenged her identification evidence. 53 In response, the state offered and the trial court admitted the testimony of
one Alonzo Bellmar. 54 Bellmar, in a later incident, had chased a man
be discovered exiting his home through a window. This man, identified
as the defendant, ran toward a tan Ford with Indiana license plate
number 99T8889 parked nearby before Bellmar lost sight of him. The
Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the state's argument that Bellmar's
other crime testimony fit within the common scheme or plan exception55
but declared the evidence highly relevant to the issue of identity and
therefore admissible. 56 The only significantly identifiable feature here,
besides the witnesses' identification, was the license plate number. That

law that a trial court ignores improperly admitted evidence, absent any indication it
significantly affected the court's decision. E.g., Pinkston v. State, 436 N .E.2d 306, 308
(Ind. 1982); Phelan v. State, 273 Ind. 542, 546, 406 N.E.2d 237, 239 (1980).
4
~Eakins, 484 N.E.2d at 609. The court also stated that the evidenc·e fit the common
plan or scheme exception. Id. Indiana courts seem frequently to confuse the "modus
operandi'' exception with the common plan or scheme exception. This latter exception is
used to "prove the existence of a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which
the present crime on trial is a part." E.W. CLEARY, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190, at 448 (2d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter HANDBOOK
OF EviDENCE]. It is apparent from the facts in Eakins that there were two separate,
distinguishable incidents that were not smaller parts of any larger, deliberate scheme to
seduce and then harass the female student population of the high school. The defendant
could not have had a deliberate plan in mind that both relationships would be ended by
the victim and he would subsequently harass them by telephone. Rather, the cause and
effect nature of both offenses would make the "motive" exception to the rule much more
applicable than the common scheme or plan exception.
50
489 N .E.2d 68 (Ind. 1986).
$•Jd. at 69.
szJd. at 70. She was acquainted with and recognized the defendant but had at first
confused his name with that of someone else. Id.
Slid.
54 /d. at 70-71.
~'Id.

/d. (presumably, although not denominated so, under the "modus operandi,, exception).
$

6

•
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evidence was so specific and so singular as to be the hypothetical ''silver
51
. cross-bow" regarded as ideal signature evidence of a perpetrator. Such
a perfect example of the ''modus operandi'' /identity exception is obviously rare. Where identity was the issue and the jury would not be
misled, there could be no argument that the evidence was neither logically
nor legally relevant. The evidence was properly admitted.
The unfortunate Leroy Williams was the defendant in two cases
59
58
during the survey period. In the first Williams v. State, Williams was
apprehended in the home of 74-year-old Mabel Carpenter, Williams
advised the police that he had stolen a television set earlier that evening
during the burglary of another home. On appeal, Williams argued that
the trial court had improperly admitted this statement during his trial
for the burglary of Carpenter's home. 60 The Indiana Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's admission on the grounds that it was relevant
to establish Williams' intent and/ or motive for the burglary. 61 The
supreme court aptly and succinctly declared: '' [T]here is no substantial
question that the defendant committed the acts which led to the charge,
but rather the issue is the defendant's motive or criminal intent" in
breaking and entering. 62 Williams' confession of the television theft from
another home was the only evidence of his motive and intent to commit
the felony of theft in Carpenter's home and was crucial to proving all
the elements of the charged burglary. This evidence would not have
prejudiced the defendant before the jury and was therefore not legally
irrelevant.
A similar Indiana Supreme Court decision just five weeks prior to
Williams came to a similar conclusion but without the same reasoned
analysis. In Sizemore v. State, 63 the facts were not nearly as clear as
in Williams. A Mr. Abel chased the defendant and another intruder out
of the ransacked second story of his home and forced them to surrender
after he fired a shot into the rear of their car. Upon investigation, the
.

.

.

57

See

58

Williams v. State, 489 N.E.2d 53 (Ind. 1986); Williams v. State, 481 N.E.2d 1319

FEDERAL PRACTICE

&

PROCEDURE,

supra note 8. § 5246, at 513.

(Ind. 1985).
39

481 N.E.2d 1319 (Ind. 1985).
tt~.>fd. at 1321.
61
/d. The then extant burglary statute defined the charged offense as follows:
A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person,
with intent to commit a felony in it, commits burglary, a Class C felony.
However, the offense is a Class B felony if it is committed while armed with
a deadly weapon or if the building or structure is a dwelling, and a Class A

IND.

felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any person
other than a defendant.
CODE § 35·43-2-1 (1982).
62
Williams, 481 N.E.2d at 1321.
63
480 N.-E.2d 215 (Ind. 1985).
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police and Abel discovered on Abel's premises several items that had
been stolen from two other homes that same day. The supreme court,
in upholding the admission of these items into evidence, relied upon the
intent and the common scheme or plan exceptions.64
The court did not precisely explain how the intent exception applied
in Sizemore. However, the facts of this case fit within the Williams
analysis described above. The evidence was relevant to show that the
defendant intended to commit theft once he had entered the premises. 65
The court did explain that the items taken from other residences established a common plan or scheme of the defendant and his accomplice
to burglarize residences that particular day. 66 The problem with the court's
reasoning is that the court injected the ''signature'' requirement of the
"modus operandi" exception into its explanation of the common scheme
or plan exception, thereby confusing evidence of identity with evidence
of intent. 67 There was no need for identity evidence because identity was
never in question. The court's common scheme or plan analysis was
also weak because the "distinctive" feature upon which the court focused
was the manner of entry into the burglarized homes kicking in the
front door. 68 Such kicking is hardly distinctive, however, when even
homeowners have been known to do the same thing to their own homes.
Other than this flawed dictum, the court's review of the trial court's
admission of the other crime evidence of theft, which circumstantially
linked the defendant to all three locations, was sound.
A rather perfunctory result arose in Brackens v. State. 69 In that
case, the defendant was accused of sexually molesting his seven-yearold niece by marriage. 70 The challenged evidence was the victim's tes71
timony that the defendant had engaged in prior sexual acts with her.
The issue addressed by this evidence was the defendant's denial of the
prior acts and his further denial that he had even touched the victim
that day. The trial court allowed the testimony under the ''depraved
sexual instinct'' exception, to show that the defendant had had prior
sexual contact with the victim, despite his denial of the charged offense. 72

64

/d. at 217.

6Sfd.

6/)/d. Such a conclusion might also have been appropriate to show the intent element,
particularly since the defendant relied upon the defense of intoxication despite his testimony
that he had accompanied the accomplice throughout the day. See also HANDBOOK OF
EviDENCE, supra note 49, § 190, at 448-49.
67
See supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text.
68
Sizemore, 480 N.E.2d at 217.
69
480 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1985).
70
/d. at 538.
7
'/d. at 539.
72Jd.

-.
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The -s upreme court supported the trial court's ruling. However,_ the
evidence of past acts in this case may not have been relevant to any
specific factual dispute at issue. Such a blanket application of the
depraved sexual instinct exception regardless of the facts exemplifies how
courts tend to use this exception as a general rule when certain sex
offenses are charged and there is evidence that the defendant has committed the- same or a similar offense at another time. 73 Such uncritical
application of the exception seems to undermine the general rule of
exclusion. However, one commentator has defended this type of general
use of the depraved sexual instinct exception by arguing that it creates
74
an ''issue" akin to a motive for committing the offense. This ''motive"
is that the defendant has ''a passion or propensity for illicit sexual
75

relations with the particular person concerned in the crime on trial.' '
An implication that the defendant has a character flaw, such as a general
propensity for this kind of behavior, is mitigated by limiting the evidence
to a relationship with only the victim. 76 On this restricted basis, the
admission of the evidence in Brackens was entirely appropriate and was
no more prejudicial than the charged offense itself. 77

13

See

HANDBOOK OF EVIDENCE,

supra note 49, § 190, at 449 n.40.

74

/d. at 449-50.
15
/d. at 449 n.38 (emphasis added).
76
lt would appear, however, that some Indiana cases have used the "depraved sexual
instinct'' exception without regard to whether the victim is the same in all of the offenses.
See, e.g., Austin v. State, 262 Ind. 529, 319 N .E.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1012 (l975); Miller v. State, 256 Ind. 296, 268 N.E.2d 299 (1971). The rationale for this
expansion of the exception may be that the unnaturalness of the sex act is distinctive in
and of itself. See HANDBOOK OF EviDENCE, supra note 49, § 190, at 449. This is especiaHy
important now that th.e Indiana Supreme Court no longer categorizes rape among the
exceptions for depraved sexual instinct (at least where consent is the only issue). See,
e.g., Jenkins v. State, 474 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985); Malone v. State, 441 N'. E.2d 1339
(Ind. 1982); Meeks v. State, 249 Ind. 659, 234 N.E.2d 629 (1968). But any extension of
admissibility on the basis of the unusual nature <;»f sex crimes lends its_e lf to the dangers
of admitting offenses that may only show a repeated commission of the same sort of
crime rather than evidence of crimes with unusual features. Such a result has been decried
by Indiana courts. See, e.g., Duvose v. State, 257 Ind. 450;. 452, 275 N .E.2d 536, 537
(1971) (rape); see also Raines v. State, 251 Ind. 248, 240 N.E.2d 819 (1968) (evidence of
homosexual acts has no relevance at murder trial).
77
The supreme court also noted that most of the victim;s :c hallenged testimony came
forth during her cross-examination by the defense, as if to imply that any error in
admission was harmless because the defendant ''opened the door.'' Brackens, 480 N.E.2d
at 539. See also Haynes v. State, 411 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Gilliam v.
State, 270 Ind. 71, 76-77, 383 N .E.2d 297, 301 :( 1978). Such implication though misses
the point when it was the state that first raised the topic on direct examination, although
defendanes cross-examination on the subject could arguably be a waiver of any objection
to the original dire_c t testimony.
•
The irony is that the court misapplied the "opened door" exception later in the
case. Brackens took the stand in his own defense to deny the charges. Brackens, 480

•
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An interesting set of facts arose in Gibbs v. State, 78 where the
defendant was convicted of attempted murder for a vehicular attack on
a woman he later married. 79 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
trial court erred in allowing the state to question him and the victim
about their prostitution·related activities. 80 The defendant had a business
as well as a romantic relationship with the victim, involving the victim's
employment as a prostitute. At the time of the attack, the victim was
preparing to leave the defendant's employ. The Indiana Supreme Court
held that such evidence could well provide information about the defendant's motive for the attack. 81 Such evidence was deemed particularly

N.E.2d at 539. In doing so, he put his credibility as a witness at issue. The state was
thus justified in introducing evidence of his prior convictions for theft and robberyinfamous crimes-to impeach him. The court declared the defendant had "opened the
door, for impeachment purposes. !d. at 540. While this evidence fits the classic Ashton
v. Anderson, 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210 (1972), formula for impeachment of Brackens'
credibility, it has nothing to do with the "opened door" exception. See supra notes 4
and 5 and accompanying text. Although theft was not originally considered in the Ashton
v. Anderson genre, the Indiana Supreme Court considered it a crime involving dishonesty
and added it to the Ashton list in Fletcher v. State, 264 Ind. 132, 136-37, 340 N .E.2d
771, 774-75 (1976). However, admission of theft convictions can be prohibited if they
"arise from factual situations which do not indicate a lack of veracity on the part of
the witness." /d. at 137, 340 N .E.2d at 775. This limitation can only be triggered by
defense counsel, preferably by motion in limine. /d. In the absence of a proper foundation
by defense counsel, one must assume that Brackens• theft conviction was properly admitted
for impeachment purposes.
A classic "opened door'' testimony did arise in the murder/battery case of Davis
v. State, 481 N.E.2d 387 (Ind. 1985). The defendant called one Coomes as a witness to
buttress his claim of self-defense. Coomes testified about a conversation the defendant
had had with his two victims during which the victims discussed their prison experiences.
This evidence was adduced to substantiate the defendant's fear that these two men would
seriously injure or kill him and to explain why he stabbed them during a fight. /d. at
389. What the defendant tried to "close the door" on was the fact that during that same
conversation, he revealed to the victims that he too had been in prison. The trial court
had allowed this fact to be brought out on Coomes's cross-examination. /d. The Indiana
Supreme Court ruled that not only was this testimony highly relevant to rebut defendant's
factual defense, but that he had also opened the door on direct examination. /d. As the
court remarked:
[O]ur courts frequently have held in other contexts that a party may not submit
evidence of part of a conversation, transaction, deposition or the evidentiary
material without giving the other party an opportunity to introduce the remaining
material if it is necessary to explain or illustrate the context from which the
excerpted evidence was taken, or to mitigate the prejudice caused by introduction
of only part of the evidence in question.
/d. This correct statement of the exception contrasts starkly with the court's statements
in Brackens.
78
483 N.E.2d 1365 (Ind. 1985).
79
/d. at 1366.
80
/d. at 1368.
81
/d. A similar set of facts was present in Harms v. State, 156 Ind. App. 123, 295
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relevant where motive was tied to the specific intent element of the
attempted murder charge and where the victim denied that the defendant
struck her intentionally. 82 Because the unrelated prostitution activities
could hardly prejudice a jury trying an attempted murder case, the
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any dangers of
legal irrelevance, and the supreme court properly upheld the trial court.
The last example of a correctly-decided case dealt with a problem
all too frequently encountered in trial courts. In Riley v. State, 83 the
Indiana Supreme Court reversed a drug dealing conviction because the
state had injected an "evidentiary harpoon" into the trial, under the
guise of the common scheme or plan ·exception. 84 The trial court had
granted the defendant's motion in limine to protect him from any mention
of prior drug use or sales. ss In spite of the court's order and the
defendant's repeated objections, the prosecutor persisted in questioning
the state's sole witness about prior buys from the defendant. 86 The trial
court eventually relented and allowed the evidence upon a showing that
there were similarities among all of the defendant's sales to the witness. 87
In reversing, the supreme court declared there were no distinctive
characteristics of the transactions to fit within the common scheme
exception. 88 Thus, the evidence had been improperly admitted, particularly
with respect to drug use. 89 The court then astutely observed that because
the state's sole evidence was from a single witness, the "evidentiary
harpoon'' 90 of improper evidence injected by the state could only have
bolstered its case unfairly before the jury. 91 The defendant was therefore
granted a new trial. 92

N.E.2d 156 (1973), where the deceased victim threatened to withdraw from a burglary
ring and go to the police.
82
Gibbs, 483 N .E.2d at 1366.
83489 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. 1986).
84
/d. at 61.
85
/d. at 59.
86
/d. at 59·61.
87
/d. at 61.
88
/d. The court would probably have been more correct if it had addressed the
"modus operandP' exception.
89/d.
90
"Evidentiary harpoon" is defined in Indiana as that circumstance "where the
prosecution through its witnesses successfully places evidence before the jury which is
improper . . . in situations where such evidence would not be admissible.'' Grimes v.
State, 258 Ind. 257, 262, 280 N .E.2d 575, 578 (1972) (citation omitted).
91
Riley, 489 N .E.2d at 61. The evidence of prior sales was also not crucial to show
that the witness could identify the defendant because they were also friends. See, e.g.,
United States v. Juarez, 561 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1977).
92
Ri/ey, 489 N.E.2d at 61.
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Right Result, Wrong Reason

•

In this next group of cases, the· appellate courts reached the proper
conclusion that evidence of other crimes fell within one of the permitted
exceptions to the general rule of exclusion. However, the specific exceptions invoked by the courts were not necessarily correct.
In Jones v . State, 93 the supreme court clearly demonstrated the respect
given to trial court discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
The defendant was convicted of robbery and criminal deviate conduct
for robbing a savings and loan association and forcing one of the female
employees to disrobe and commit oral sodomy. 94 At trial, the victim of
a similar crime testified to events occurring several weeks earlier at a
gas station one-half block from the savings and loan. This witness had
been unable to identify her attacker until the police showed her a picture
of the savings and loan perpetrator. The defendant argued that evidence
95
of the gas station incident was inadmissible at trial.
The supreme court ruled the evidence admissible to prove the perpetrator's identity and to prove a common plan or scheme, because of
the distinctive characteristics present in both crimes. 96 However, the
common plan or scheme exception is used to ''prove the existence of
a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the present
crime on trial is a part.' ' 97 Such a larger plan did not exist here nor
did the court so hold. What the court was actually using, without properly
identifying it, was the ''modus operandi" exception wherein other crime
evidence· is admissible on the grounds of relevance because of the same
distinct, unusual, or unique method employed in committing the charged
offense. 98
By repeated, improper use of the term "common scheme or plan,"
Indiana courts have bastardized the "modus operandi" exception by
requiring something less than an unusual or unique device. Perhaps by
connoting "common," "scheme," and "plan" instead of "modus operandi,'' the courts have felt compelled to admit evidence as meager as
some vague pattern of behavior. As a consequence, many decisions have
upheld the admission of evidence evincing no characteristics distinct from
other crimes committed by other defendants under the rubric of ''common
•

3479 N .E.2d 44 (Ind. 1985).
94
/d. at 44.
• 95 /d. at 46.
96/d.
97
HANDBOOK OF EviDENCE, supra note 49, § 190, at 448-49 (footnote omitted).
98 See supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text. One could argue that this is
a hypertechnical distinction when in fact the unique features of both offenses, and not
the name of the exception, were the actual test of admissibility in the case and the correct
result was reached. The distinction is valid.
9
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scheme or plan."99 In other words, "similarities'' has become the op. .
erative term, rather than "uniqueness." This lapse creates problems in
a case such as Jones v. State where the only truly distinctive element
of each offense was the combination of armed robbery at a business
establishment with the commission of an act of oral sodomy upon a
female employee.
But for the nature of the premises and the specific nature of the
deviate sex act involved, Jones would be no different from any other
offense combining violent larceny with a violent sex act. It is not unusual
for rape and robbery to be combined during a residential burglary, 100
but it is arguable that forcing a victim to commit fellatio where the
perpetrator risks detection during business hours of the targeted establishment is unique. Thus, in Jones there was minimal logical relevance
of the other crime evidence to the issue of Jones' identity . 101 As for

ln Wiles v. State, 437 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. 1982), the state put on the testimony of
a prior rape victim during the burglary/attempted rape trial of the defendant. The
"identification" exception (presumably common scheme or plan) was invoked to show
the following similarities between the two events:
(I) the perpetrator threatened the victim with a knife;
(2) money and jewelry were stolen;
(3) the perpetrator wore a long-sleeved shirt in mid-summer;
(4) the attacks occurred in the same area of Indianapolis;
(5) the attacks were seventeen days apart; and
(6) the attacker cut the cords to the victims' extension phones.
/d. at 39. Unfortunately, this scenario is common in other run-of-the-mill rape/burglary
offenses. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 275 Ind. 434, 417 N .E.2d 328 (1981); Willis v.
State, 268 Ind. 269, 374 N .E.2d 520 (1978). In fact, the common scheme or plan exception
was also used in Williams v. State to admit factual similarities in two separate incidents
of rape. The admitted facts "were:
( 1) two perpetrators;
(2) one wore a ski mask, the other a red hooded sweatshirt;
(3) obscene phone calls preceded the attacks;
(4) the victims' husbands worked nights, which was when the attacks occurred;
(5) the attackers pried open the back door and left it open afterwards;
(6) a butcher knife was used to threaten the victims;
(7) the victims' hands were tied;
(8) the perpetrators cut the phone wires;
(9) the attacks were about a week apart; and
(
1
0)
the
attackers
stole
personal
property
.
.
Williams, 215 Ind. at 440, 417 N .E.2d at 332. The red hooded sweatshirt was perhaps
a distinctive enough feature in Williams to justify admission of the evidence. However,
there does not appear to have been any question of identity involved in the case.
100
See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 474 N .E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985); Wiles v. State, 437 N .E.2d
35 (Ind. 1982); Williams v. State, 275 Ind. 434, 417 N.E.2d 328 (1981).
101
The facts of Jones are not the least bit illuminating with regard to the defense of
the case and whether identity was in serious dispute. Due to the seriousness of the crime,
one can presume that the defendant denied any involvement, thereby putting his identity
at issue.
99

•

•
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legal relevance, prejudice to the defendant was diminished by the fact
that both crimes \\iere of the same inflammatory nature. Because the
charged crime was highly offensive, a jury was unlikely to have been
prejudiced by evidence of a second evil act. It would appear then that
the Indiana Supreme Court's affirmance of Jones' conviction upon
evidence having such a tenuous relevancy connection was a deferral to
the trial court's discretion to admit such evidence.l 02
The next case in the ''right result, wrong reason" genre is Schoffstall
v. State.I 03 Schoffstall was convicted of reckless homicide for the death
of his infant son, which occurred while the baby was in Schoffstall's
custody. 104 During trial, Schoffstall objected to the admission of autopsy
photographs and to the testimony of a forensic pathologist that prior
to the date of death, the baby had sustained numerous injuries to his
spleen, left lung, lip, eye and cheek, and brain. 105 The pathologist
concluded the baby was a victim of child abuse syndrome. 106 Schoffstall's
wife also testified to circumstantial evidence of his abuse of the baby,
and Schoffstall himself admitted during statements to police that he had
hit the child. Schoffstall objected to the admission of this c ,ridence on
107
· grounds of irrelevancy and immateriality. The court of appeals concluded that the evidence was admissible under the relevancy exceptions_
of motive, intent, or common scheme or plan. tos
The evidence was indeed admissible but not under any of these
named exceptions. Although the facts are not clear with respect to what
offense Schoffstall was. charged with, it is clear he was convicted of
reckless homicide. 109 The statutory elements of this crime are: ''A person
who recklessly kills another human being commits reckless homicide, a
Class C felony.'' 110 Reckless homicide is not an ''intentional'' crime for

.

102

An argumen.t can also be made for reversal. It appears that there was sufficient
independent evidence of identity by the employees of the savings and loan to obviate the
need for the other victim's testimony. One could also contend, obversely to the author's
conclusion, that because the very nature of the crimes was so inflammatory, evidence of
a second such crime by th~ defendant would have prejudiced the Jury. Precedential authority
would have permitted reversal under such circumstances. See, e.g., Riddle v. State, 264
Ind. 587, 348 N.E.2d 635 (1976); Brooks v. State, 156 Ind. App. 414, 296 N.E.2d 894
(1973). Because of the abuse of discretion standard, however, the: issue of reversal in
Jones becomes an academic :q uestion the answer to which is dependent upon evidence
which may be in the record but is not clearly set forth in the opinion.

488 N .E.2d 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
104
/d. at 351.
10
'/d. at 351-54.
106
/d. at 351.
103

lfY'IJd. at 354.

/d. at 355.
109
/d. at 350.
108

uoiND. ConE § 35-42-1-5 (1982).
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which prior child abuse evidence would be relevant to show motive or
intent, as it would for murder.n' Use of the common scheme or plan
exception is not justified either because typically child abuse is not a
continuing deliberate plan or scheme but rather is the result of uncontrollable and/or irrational behavior continuing in an unplanned and
erratic fashion throughout a parent
(adult)/child relationship~
.
The valid relevance exception better suited for child abuse cases,
although not yet adopted by Indiana courts, is the "corpus delicti,
exception. The "corpus delicti" exception allows the admission of evidence of other crimes as proof that a criminal act took place. 112 This
exception is particularly useful where the defendant acknowledges that
harm occurred but denies that the harm was caused by arty criminal
instrumentality. 113 Refuting the defense of absence of "corpus delicti"
requires a showing that the defendant has, in the past, engaged in similar
criminal conduct. 114 The risk inherent in the '~corpus delicti" exception
is that it may be easily abused to show only propensity, a result scrupulously rejected by the case law.~ 15 However, in Schoffstall, evidence
that the defendant's relationship with his son was characterized by
instances of other criminally violent acts of physical abuse tended directly
to rebut defendant's allegation that the child was injured by accident. 116
Application of this "corpus delicti" exception should be limited to
admission of evidence of a pattern of child abuse between the defendant
and the victim. If so applied, the exception would be consistent with
an ideal application of the depraved sexual instinct exception where
evidence of criminal acts with other victims is excluded. Such a limitation
would avoid the problems arising in cases such as United States v.
Woods, 117 where the defendant's propensity for abusing children in general
•

rSee Worthington v. State, 273 Ind. 499, 405 N.E.2d 913 (1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 915 (1981) (defendant charged and convicted of second degree murder for death of
seven-year-old adopted daughter); O'Conner v. State, 272 Ind. 460, 399 N.E.2d 364 (1980)
(defendant charged with second degree murder of three-year-old child); Corbin v. State~
250 Ind. 147~ 234 N.E.2d 261 (1968) (defendant indicted first degree, convicted second
degree murder of 21-month-old daughter). In each of- these cases, prior evidence of child
abuse was admitted for the purpose of showing malice, premeditation, intent, or motive.
These exceptions were appropriately applied tlecause o.f the intentional nature of the
charged and/or convicted offenses. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3404 (Burns 1956) (second
degree murder). For current version, see IND. ConE § 35-42-1-3 (1986).
111
See FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 8, § 5239, at 460 (footnotes
omitted).
11

llJfd.

114/d.

/d. at 460-61.
116
Schojjstal/, 488 N .E.2d at 354·55.
117484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.
1973). In Woods, the defendant was convicted for the
smothering death of her eight-month•old foster son, who died of cyanosis. ld. at 128-29.
115
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became the chief characteristic of the evidence. 118 In Schoffstall, the
evidence of previous abuse to the same infant was highly relevant to
establish that a "corpus delicti'' existed despite Schoffstall's representations of an accident. The logical relevance by sheer necessity substantially outweighed any potential prejudice. The court of appeals'
reasoning notwithstanding, the evidence was properly admitted.
Hossman v. State 119 is not analyzed for its result as much as for
the improper logic of its dicta. Hassman was convicted of burglary,
conspiracy, and receiving stolen property . 120 The burglary and conspiracy
convictions rested upon evidence that the defendant directed two other
,men to break into a home to steal some drinking glasses. 121 The defendant
challenged testimony, allowed by the trial court, alleging that one of
these same men had sold other goods to the defendant on prior occasions.122 Pointing out that there was no criminality attached to these
sales, the court of appeals noted that the sole purpose for their admission
was to show an earlier connection between the defendant and this other
man by reason of a business relationship. 123 However, the court went
further and declared that even if the state's evidence had evinced criminality, it would have fit within the common scheme or plan exception
to show identification, intent, or state of mind. 124 This declaration incorrectly invoked the common scheme or plan exception because there
was no evidence that such a plan even existed or that the burglary was
a part thereof. The common plan or scheme exception was therefore
irrelevant.
What the court did point out, perhaps unwittingly, was that the
evidence was relevant to show intent or motive. A close analysis of the
· facts and the targeted offenses reveals that the court made an excellent
connection between the charged crime and the intent and motive ex-

The prosecution was allowed to submit evidence that the defendant had been involved in
twenty earlier cyanotic episodes with nine different children, seven of whom died. Id. at
130. The controversy, of course, was balancing the difficulty of proving that the death
of the infant was caused by a criminal instrumentality and thus "corpus delicti" with
the prejudice inherent in admitting the evidence purely to show the defendant's character
flaw. The controversy will continue to rage but is really of no moment in the classic
parent/battered child relationship, such as in Schoffstall, where the abuse is part of a
continuing relationship.
118
/d. at 130-32.
119
482 N .E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
120
/d. at 1152·53. His conviction for receiving stolen property w~s reversed on a
separate appeaL /d. at 1153. The burglary
and conspiracy convictions resulted from a
.
new trial after the first was declared a mistrial. /d. at 1152-53.
121
/d. at 1152.
122
/d. at 1157.
123/d.
124/d.
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ceptions for relevancy. Evidence of Hassman's prior receipt of stolen
goods would supply a motive 125 for his vicarious involvement in the
burglaries committed by other parties, as well as show the specific intent
of theft, the predicate for burglary. Although Hassman's conviction for
receiving stolen property was overturned, the relevancy link is clear and
is sufficient to justify the admission of this evidence going to issues that
could not help but be in dispute because of Rossman's limited role in
the commission of the crime.
0

C.

No Harm, No Foul

Several cases in the survey period improperly upheld the admission
of other crime evidence; however, a thorough examination reveals that
in each case the admission was harmless. One example is Foster v.
State, 126 which otherwise would be an excellent example of the common
scheme or plan exception. In Foster, a jury found the defendant guilty
of forgery for signing his employer's name on a stolen blank payroll
check and then cashing it. 127 Among the evidence presented were three
other payroll checks cashed the same day that were within the numerical
sequence of the subject check. The conclusion was that the defendant
had embarked upon a calculated plan to obtain money through fraud. 128
This is a classic example of a common scheme or plan, where
evidence is excepted from the general rule of exclusion because it tends
to prove a fact at issue, such as the identity of the perpetrator or the
defendant's intent. The problem in Foster is that, contrary to the court's
rationale, there appears to have been no question of the defendant's
identity at trial. 129 Nor would these checks necessarily have presented
any more definite evidence of intent to defraud than the single check
upon which the information had been filed. There appears to have been
no serious dispute over any issue requiring this evidence to make the
state's case. If not, the three "unrelated" checks should have been ruled
inadmissible. However, any error was rendered harmless when the defendant's brother testified, evidently without objection, to_ the defendant's
illegal transactions with these other checks, thereby making the erroneously admitted evidence cumulative only. 130 The improperly admitted

.s For good examples of the use of the motive exception, see Jenkins v. State, 263
Ind. 589, 590-92, 335 N.E.2d 215, 216~17 (1975); Thomas v. State, 263 Ind . 198, 199201, 328 N.E.2d 212, 212-13 (1975).
126
484 N .E.2d 965 (Ind. 1985).
12
'/d. at 966.
128
1d. at 967.
129
Bank employees, called as witnesses, identified the defendant. Id. The court ruled
that the other checks "reinforced identification testimony." /d.
130
1d.; see Wallace v. State, 486 N.E.2d 445, 461 (Ind. 1985) (improperly admitted
12

•
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other crime evidence in Foster was therefore rendered nonprejudicial as
a matter of law.
Clarkson v. State131 presented another classic example of a common
scheme or plan. The defendant was convicted of theft and violation of
state securities laws for defrauding an elderly couple under the guise of
an investment plan. 132 The questionable evidence here was the testimony
of three other elderly women, who told of their own experiences with
the defendant's confidence scheme. 133 As in Foster, the evidence was
presumably ~admitted to show intent to defraud. 134 And as in Foster,
such testimony had no greater tendency to show intent than the evidence
of the charged offense itself. The other three incidents were unnecessary
to the prosecution's case. The error here is particularly acut'~ because
intent is not required to violate the securities laws, 135 and the court never
addressed the requirement of ''intent to deprive'' of use under the theft
statute. 136 Therefore, the evidence was irrelevant to any question of intent
to defraud under the securities laws because this was not an issue at
trial. And clearly the theft intent was also not the issue. Because the
other women's testimony had no logical relevance to any issue of intent,
the. evidence was inadmissible on this basis.
The court though did state that the women's testimony was crucial
to show a scheme to defraud, 137 which is an element of a securities law
violation. Again however, the testimony had no greater probity than the
evidence of the subject offense and was therefore an unnecessary presentation of cumulative evidence on an issue already adequately supported
by other evidence. But, as in Foster, any error was rendered harmless
by the defendant's failure to object to the testimony of two of the
witnesses. 138
A third common scheme or plan was present in Alvers v. State. 139
Alvers was a jeweler who had a habit of receiving stolen property and
of substituting cubic zirconias for diamonds in jewelry left in his care
for repair. The grand jury indicted him for corrupt business influence
140
upon seven predicate offenses of this nature. At trial, the objectionable
.

.

..

.

.

.

.

.

..

evidence does not require reversal if cumulative of other evidence); Johnson v. State, 251
Ind. 369, 374, 241 N .E.2d 270, 272 (1968).
131
486 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. 1985).
132
/d. at 503.
133
/d. at 506.
134Jd.
nssriefly, Indiana state securities laws presume criminal intent from a defendant's
acts. /d. at 507. See IND. CoDE § 23-2-1-1 (1982).
136See IND. CooE § 35-43-4-2(a) ( 1986).
37
' C/arkson, 486 N.E.2d at 506.
138/d.

489 N .E.2d 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)~
140
/d. at 85; see IND. ConE § 35-45-6-2 (1982).
139
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evidence was the testimony of two other victims of Alvers' operation. 141
142
The testimony was allowed as proof of a common scheme or plan.
But of what practical necessity was this testimony when tQe seven predicate offenses raised the inference of such scheme anyway? The evidence
was improperly admitted. Its admission was harmless, though, because
the testimony of the other victims could have had little, if any, prejudicial
effect on the jury's deliberations.t 43 The trial's outcome would not have
been different even had this testimo,n y been excluded because the great
weight of the evidence of a common scheme or plan presented by the
seven separate charges would have convicted Alvers: anyway.
144
In Graham v. State, the defendants were charged with and convicted
of involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, and the unlawful practice
of medicine in the death of one Sybil Bennett. 145 The Grahams had
established Hoosier Health House in order to treat individuals with
medical problems by naturopathic means, in accordance with the teachings
of a prophet of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Bennett went to
the Grahams for treatment of a lump on her breast. Without the benefit
of conventional medical treatment, Bennett eventually died under the
Grahams' care from complications of breast cancer. At trial,. the state
introduced evidence that the Grahams were administering ana charging
for similar services provided to other pe·o ple.146 The court of appeals
upheld the admission of this evidence for purposes of showing ~'intent,
motive, purpose, identification, or a common scheme or plan. " 147 This
bare· recital of the general exception, with no further explanation, was
the only rationale given. At most, the evidence showed a common scheme
to engage in the unlawful practice of medicine, but there was no issue
in dispute requiring the evidence as proof of identity or intent. The
evidence pertinent to Bennett's death was sufficient to show the defend ...
ants' unlawful practice of medicine. More evidence of the same character,
presented even as part of a scheme, would not have had any tendency
to make the existence of the unlawful practice of medicine any more
probable than without it. Nor was the evidence relevant to any material
issue of fact as to the manslaughter and reckless homicide charges. The
evidence was irrelevant and therefore improperly admitted. However, as
in Alvers, because of the sheer weight of the state's case, there was no
danger that the improper admission misled or unfairly prejudiced the
jury; it was harmless error.

A/vers, 489 N .E.2d at 89.
142
/d. at 90.
14
~See, e.g., Gill v. State, 467 N.E~2d 724, 725 (Ind. 1984); Brewster v. State, 450
N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ind. 1983).
144
4'80 N .E.2d 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
145
ld. at 983-84 (footnotes omitted).
146
/d. at 992.
141Jd.
141
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The second Williams v. State 148 case involved Williams' conviction
for the other burglary he confessed to committing after his apprehension
in Mrs. Carpenter's home. 149 To review briefly, Williams was convicted
for burglary of the Carpenter home. His confession to an earlier burglary
and theft was used to establish his intent to commit theft in the Carpenter ·
home. 150 The state's case here, the prosecution of that other burglary,
was based upon Williams' confession, the presence of a stolen television
nearby, and fresh blood matching Williams' blood type found on the
burglarized premises. 151 During trial, the state was granted leave to
describe Williams' arrest in Carpenter's home, especially the fact that
he was bleeding at the time. 152 There is no problem with the admission
of evidence that Williams was bleeding at the time of his arrest; what
was error was the admission of evidence of the situs of the arrest. The
state's evidence of Williams' presence at the first house {blood) and of
the theft of the television therefrom was sufficient for conviction. The
fact that Williams was in Carpenter's house at the time of his arrest
and had committed another burglary there had no probative value to
the state's case and was erroneously admitted. It was harmless error,
however, for the same reason as in Graham and Alvers; the evidence
of the charged offense and of the defendant's guilt was not so equivocal
as to have unfairly affected the jury.
The error in the next "no harm-no foul" case was also harmless
by reason of the very limited effect the improper evidence could have
had on the jury. Forehand v. State 153 involved the defendant's conviction
for dealing in phencyclidine (PCP), a Schedule II controlled substance. 154
During the state's examination of the arresting officers, an earlier sale
of marijuana, made at the defendant's direction, was revealed. 155 The
Indiana Supreme Court upheld the admission of the testimony on the
basis of res gestae . 156 The marijuana sale was held to be part and parcel
of the negotiation and sale of the PCP even though the marijuana sale
157
was three days before the commission
of
the
charged
offense.
.
The application of the res gestae exception was stretched beyond its
limits. As the court itself stated, "Under the res gestae exception evidence
may be introduced which completes the story of the crime by proving
its immediate context .... " 158 There was no "immediacy" to the context
489 N.E.2d 53 (Ind. 1986).
149
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
150
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
151
Williams, 489 N .E.2d at 55.
152Jd.
lS 3479 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. 1985).
154
/d. at 554.
148

•

.

U5Jd.
6

/d.
157
/d. at 554;.55.
18
' /d. at 554 (emphasis added).

"

r

.j.

206

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:183

here of three days' passage of time. 1s9 Even the civil application of the
res gestae doctrine could not be extended to justify such a broad application.t60 The res gestae exception simply did not apply, and it was
error to admit the evidence of the marijuana sale.
One could perhaps argue that the common plan or scheme exception
would be appropriate, but the relevancy of a marijuana sale would be
difficult to establish at a trial for dealing in PCP. However, there is
the possibility that the marijuana sale exhibited a common plan to sell
controlled substances of all kinds. The problem though is that there was
no issue in dispute requiring proof of such a plan. When the strength
of the state's direct evidence from the testimony of the undercover
officers is considered, there was no element left to be proven that was
not brought out by their statements. However, because of this strength
of the state's case and the discretion given to the trial court, the error
in admission of this other crime evidence can only ·be deemed harmless.
The last of the "harmless error" cases is Wooden v. State, 161 in

·~ 9 See,

e.g., Moster v. Bower, 153 Ind. App. 158, 170, 286 N.E~2d 418, 425 (1972);
Tenta v. Guraly, 140 Ind. App. 160, 170-71, 221 N.E.2d 577, 582-83 (1967) (res gestae
statements must relate to main event).
'60'fhe court cites to a case expanding the res gestae exception outside the immediate
time frame to justify the evidence here. /d. at 555. (citing Altman v. State, 466 N .E.2d
716 (Ind. 1984))~ But that still does not prevent the conclusion that use of the res gestae
exception in criminal trials in Indiana has been stretched far beyond the definition of the
term given in Lee v. State, 267 Ind. 315, 320, 370 N.E.2d 327, 329 (1977) (citation
omitted) as "acts, statements, occurrences and circumstances substantially contemporaneous
with the crime charged." In the civil context, res gestae refers to a "spontaneous and
instinctive reaction to a startling or unusual occurrence during which interval certain
statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate
design in the formulation of their content" and is used as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Moster, 153 Ind. App. at 170, 286 N.E.2d at 425 (emphasis deleted). See also Tenta,
140 Ind. App. at 170-71, 221 N.E.2d at 582-83. Its application in criminal law should
ideally have the same immediacy limitations but not necessarily as an exception to anything,
much less as a rule of exclusion of other crime evidence.
What reflection can other crimes committed as part of or immediately with reference
to the charged offense have upon the defendant's character? How can it prejudice a
defendant's case as being unfairly entered into evidence? There seems to be no valid
reason for applying the rule of exclusion to "necessary parts of the proof of an entire
deed," "inseparable elements of the deed," or "concomitant parts of the criminal act."
lA J.H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 218 (3d ed. 1983). So why
even have a res gestae exception in criminal law? See Wilson v. State, 491 N .E.2d 537
(Ind. 1986) (application of res gestae exception conforms to Wigmore's non-exception).
If there is evidence of other crimes that are part and parcel of a common plan or scheme,
but which are inadmissible under res gestae because of a lack of immediate context, other
exceptions already exist to allow admissibility. It therefore might be wise to consider the
abolition of the rule altogether in the criminal context and either admit the other crime
evidence as an inseparable portion of the charged crime or under the common scheme
or plan exception.
161
486 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. 1985).
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which the defendant was on trial for robbery . 162 The trial court granted
his motion in limine to prohibit the state from eliciting testimony that
he may have been involved in any other offense while armed with a
gun. 163 The testimony of the officer who investigated the instant offense
revealed that the defendant's mug shot was shown to the victim for
identification. The trial court overruled a defense motion for mistrial,
and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. 164 The court declared that the
testimony did not exceed the boundaries of the motion in limine and
only explained the officer's investigation. 165
Besides the fact that the officer's investigation appeared to be of
little relevance to the charged offense, there was absolutely no need for
his testimony that the police had a photograph of the defendant in their
files. Mug shots and any references thereto are, with rare exceptions,
inadmissible because of their tendency to show that a defendant has
committed or was a suspect in other crimes. 166 The gratuitous injection
of this information may well have been inadvertent, but it was nonetheless
improper. The defendant's motion for mistrial was properly denied,
though, because he could not possibly have been prejudiced by the
improper evidence. The victim positively and unequivocally identified
the defendant as the robber. In fact, shortly after the crime, the victim
recognized him on the street and followed him before calling the police.
Any error in the reference to the defendant's police photograph was
therefore harmless.

D.

Wrong Result

The only case during the survey period in which an error in admission
of other crime evidence may well have been prejudicial was Stout v.
State.l 67 This conclusion is based upon the facts revealed in the opinion.
A review of the actual trial transcript might lead to a different conclusion,
but this analysis is confined to the recitation of facts in the reported
case,
In Stout, the offending evidence was initially entered via testimony
of the defendant's accomplice in burglary and theft. 168 The accomplice

/d. at 442.
163/d.
64
l /d. at 443.
16Sfd.

162

Police investigation evidence was properly restricted in Williams v. Statet 491 N .E.2d
540, 541 (Ind. 1986) (police officer not allowed to testify to defendant's initial arrest on
unrelated charge), but was not in O'Grady v. State, 481 N.E.2d 115, 119-20 n.l (Ind.
Ct. App. 1985) (conviction reversed where police officer's testimony of informant's story
went beyond established bounds of non-objectionable hearsay).
167
479 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1985).
r68Jd. at 567.
166
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implicated the defendant as a participant in multiple burglaries committed
prior to the charged offense.. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the
admission of this evidence ''to show common scheme or plan, intent,
169
purpose or identity.'' It furnished no further illumination than a citation
to another case, Foresta v. State. 170 Unfortunately, Foresta is as scantily
reasoned as Stout and refers only to other crime evidence pertinent t.o
proof of identity. 171 Identity was not at issue in Stout. The common
plan or scheme exception might be relevant if the facts of the case were
clearer because the defendant and his accomplice apparently committed
several burglaries within a short time period. However, there is no
evidence in the opinion to justify a conclusion that the defendant engaged
in a common plan or scheme for a singular purpose. The defendant's
activities were simply a series of multiple unrelated offenses of which
the charged offense was only one. 172 The only other value the evidence
had was to show criminal propensity, which is an impermissible use.
The admission of the accomplice's testimony cannot be deemed legally
harmless because other improper evidence was later admitted upon the
ground that the accomplice's testimony was properly admitted.
During the further course of the state's case, a police officer testified
to the course of his investigation leading to the arrest of the defendant. 173
During this testimony, the officer discussed the whereabouts of the
defendant and his accomplice on the days prior to the charged crime. 174
Although the opinion does not recite the actual testimony, it is evident
that it concerned the other break-ins and the defendant's role in them,.
The supreme court upheld the admission of the officer's testimony based
in part upon the admissibility of the accomplice's testimony. 175 But, as
already pointed out, that testimony was improperly admitted. Therefore,
the officer's testimony was also improperly admitted. The sum effect
of these two errors added to the. posture of the case as otherwise set
forth in the opinion indicates that reversal was required.
The other crime evidence elicited from these two witnesses had no
logical relevance to any material fact at issue in the trial. The majority
of the state's case appears to have rested on the credibility of the
accomplice's te~timony as to the facts. 176 His credibility could only have
been bolstered by the corroborating testimony of a police officer. Ad.
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169Jd.

274 Ind. 658, 413 N.E.2d 889 (1980).
171
/d. at 660, 413 N.E.2d at 890-91.
112
ln fact, the supreme court itself treated the charged offense as being motivated by
a need for money, which is presumably in contradistinction to whatever undisclosed reason
motivated the other offenses. Stout, 479 N .E.2d at 565.
173
/d. at 567.
174
/d. at 568.
175 /d.
176
Also diminishing the persuasiveness of the state's case is the fact 'that the home
170
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mission of the other crime evidence obviously enhanced the prosecutor's
case in the eyes of the jury. However, the evidence was used only to
show the defendant's propensity for crime rather than substantively to
prove his guilt of the charged offense. Therefore, this evidence, both
legally and logically irrelevant, caused prejudicial error and the case
should have been reversed for a new trial. 177
IV.

CoNCLUSION

After this cursory glance at the notable cases in this survey period,
it is apparent that the appellate courts of Indiana have properly applied
the other crime exceptions less than fifty percent of the time, at least
in published opinions. It is difficult to determine why there is a probletn
in this area. It is not difficult to imagine that in the heat of trial, minor
errors will be made by both the bench and the trial attorneys. Some
of these exceptions are based on subtle nuances in the facts, and the
speed at which a trial is conducted is not always conducive to sorting
through these nuances to reach a proper decision. Under the circumstances, it is remarkable that even though the published opinions improperly applied the law so often, the trial courts actually erred only
once.
There is a remedy which will prevent the occurrence of the errors
made in the survey opinions which are more often errors of analysis
than of substance. That solution is to know the facts of each case.
Only a thorough knowledge of the facts present in both the state's and
the defense's cases can give one a proper perspective of the context in
which other crime evidence can be examined. This knowledge must be
supplied by the trial attorneys in both their presentation at trial and on
appeal. When the attorneys have supplied the cogent facts, the trial
courts can apply the law. In doing so, the courts must assume the
exclusion applies unless and until the facts and their unique juxtaposition
warrant the application of a specifically tailored exception for a specifically accepted purpose. The law in Indiana allowing admission of
other crime evidence despite the general prohibition is not without logic
and reason, but by its very principles, it can be applied only sparingly.
Such a thoughtful approach to the law will clarify the exceptions for
· the trial bench and will establish proper guidelines for the trial bar.
where the stolen items were found was not within the defendant's exclusive control and
was accessible to other parties, including the accomplice. See id. at 565.
177
See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 156 Ind. App. 414, 296 N.E.2d 894 (1973) (prejudicial
error to admit evidence of other thefts not reduced to conviction of defendant to show
behavioral pattern).
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